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While the magnitude of the current pandemic is still unknown, 
Eastern Europe might be facing a major regional catastrophe. 
The six countries of the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) have dys-
functional health-care systems and lack resources and protective 
equipment for their doctors and hospitals. The European Commis-
sion’s offer of immediate assistance is good news. However, much 
more will be needed to help the EU’s eastern partners fight the 
coronavirus and mitigate the socioeconomic impact of this crisis.
 – The EU’s eastern neighbors need support in developing and 
implementing coherent epidemic strategies. This should be the 
EU’s priority for the region.
 – Brussels needs to monitor EaP governments so that they do 
not misuse their extended powers for antidemocratic measures. 
Preserving the fragile tenets of democracy during and after this 
crisis is an important challenge for the EU, especially if it wishes 
to affirm its legitimacy as a geopolitical player in its neighbor-
hood in the long term. 
 – The EU should coordinate its assistance with the WHO and 
international financial institutions to mitigate the impacts of 
the restrictions already imposed. It should guide EaP countries 
in developing sustainable national action plans for economic 
recovery.
 – The EU needs to use the EaP Summit in June 2020 to amend its  
new strategy, coordinate crisis management efforts across the  
region, and increase European solidarity with the partner countries.
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The countries of the European Union’s Eastern Part-
nership (EaP) – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova, and Ukraine – are underprepared to face 
the approaching peak of the Covid-19 pandemic 
and will likely be severely affected. Against the back-
ground of chronically weak institutions and health-
care systems, political crises, upcoming elections, 
and installed states of emergency in four of the six 
states, many things can go wrong. While the EU 
does not have the capacity to focus solely on Eastern 
Europe amid current developments, two things that 
all EaP countries have in common should raise alarm 
in Brussels: the lack of a coherent national response 
to the evolving pandemic and the absence of man-
agement or financial capacity to address the likely 
economic slump in its aftermath. To prevent and 
curtail a major regional catastrophe across its east-
ern neighborhood, the EU – mostly acting through 
the European Commission as its executive branch 
– should assist these states as they each muddle 
through their own corona crises. 
ILL-EQUIPPED TO FACE THE 
ESCALATING CRISIS
As of April 6, 2020, Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine 
reported the highest total number of Covid-19 cases 
in the six partner countries of the EaP while Georgia 
reported the lowest (see Figure 1). Although the num-
bers throughout the EU’s eastern neighborhood are 
generally still low compared to its member states, the 
magnitude of infections is not yet known. Testing in 
the region is scarce. In addition, evidence shows that 
not all governments are reporting all cases in a trans-
parent manner. Experts say that Ukraine and Moldo-
va, two states directly on the EU’s external border, are 
one to two weeks away from their health-care sys-
tems facing the full brunt of the current pandemic – 
the scale of which is also still unknown.  
1 EVN Report, “Covid-19: Updates from Armenia,” March 13, 2020:  
<https://www.evnreport.com/raw-unfiltered/covid-19-updates-from-armenia> (accessed April 1, 2020).
2 Nino Tarkhnishvili, “How Prepared Is Georgian Health-care System for COVID-19 Pandemic?”, civil.ge, March 13, 2020:  
<https://civil.ge/archives/342281> (accessed April 1, 2020).
3 ТСН, “Coronavirus in Ukraine: Will There Be Enough Artificial Ventilators in the Event of a Large-Scale Epidemic” [in Ukrainian], March 14, 2020:  
<https://tsn.ua/ukrayina/koronavirus-v-ukrayini-chi-vistachit-aparativ-shtuchnogo-dihannya-u-razi-masshtabnoyi-epidemiyi-1508055.html>  
(accessed April 1, 2020).
4 Jörg Blech, “A Dearth of Nurses. COVID-19 Highlights Staff Shortages at German Hospitals,” Spiegel International, March 13, 2020:  
<https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/covid-19-highlights-staff-shortages-at-german-hospitals-a-dc13b683-3884-4683-b9c0-
68e0084a1f70> (accessed April 1, 2020).
5 Daniela Cutu, “240 Medical Employees from Moldova, Tested Positive for COVID-19” [in Romanian], TV8, April 5, 2020: 
< https://tv8.md/2020/04/05/240-de-angajati-medicali-din-moldova-testati-pozitiv-la-covid-19/> (accessed April 5, 2020).
6 Global Health Security Index, “Covid-19: Identifying the Most Vulnerable Countries Using the GHS Index and Global Flight Data,” March 13, 2020:  
<https://www.ghsindex.org/news/covid-19-identifying-the-most-vulnerable-countries-using-the-ghs-index-and-global-flight-data/> (accessed April 1, 2020).
Public health-care systems across the region are 
mostly dysfunctional and outdated. Since the 1990s, 
medical reform has never been properly prioritized. 
Hospitals, which are chronically poorly funded and 
managed, are now ill-equipped and not prepared to 
face the coronavirus crisis. There are serious short-
ages of basic protective equipment such as gloves 
and masks, as well as ventilators and oxygen. Arme-
nia, a country with 3 million inhabitants, has 334 ven-
tilators, only 15 of which are specifically reserved for 
Covid-19 patients.1 Georgia, with a population of 3.7 
million, has 40 ready for use.² Ukraine, much larger 
with 41.8 million inhabitants, has 620 in its hospitals 
for infectious diseases.³ In comparison, Germany, 
whose population is nearly twice that of Ukraine, has 
a total of 25,000 ventilators.⁴ Most countries are in a 
process of acquiring more.
Public hospitals in the EU’s eastern neighborhood 
are traditionally short-staffed; doctors and nurses 
are underpaid and overworked under normal cir-
cumstances. Due to poor working conditions with-
out appropriate protective medical equipment, it 
is health-care workers who are getting infected in 
some countries during the current pandemic and 
transmitting the virus. In Moldova, an extreme ex-
ample, every third case of infection with Covid-19 is 
medical staff.  Under anonymity, medical employ-
ees say that the rate of infection among them is very 
likely much higher.5
Of the six EaP countries, Ukraine is the most vulner-
able to emerging outbreaks, according to the Glob-
al Health Security Index.6 In addition to its sizable 
population, Ukraine has the highest volume of inter-
national and domestic travelers within its borders: 
4.4 million. A significant share of its population also 
resides abroad. Nearly 270,000 people in March 
returned to Ukraine from EU countries – many with-
out respecting the quarantine that was technically in 
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FIGURE 1: COVID-19 CASES IN EASTERN PARTNERSHIP COUNTRIES
effect due to unclear rules and guidelines upon im-
mediate entry.7 The announcement by Ukrainian au-
thorities that the country’s borders would be closed 
on March 27 resulted in seasonal and temporary 
workers lining up to cross into the country from Po-
land. Moldova had a similar experience with nearly 
45,000 people returning since mid-March, many of 
them from Italy.8
VARYING INITIAL RESPONSES
Responses by the governments of the six EaP coun-
tries to the early warning signs of the approaching 
pandemic differed widely but were equally dramat-
ic (see active restrictions in Figure 2). While Georgia 
decided to immediately introduce drastic measures 
and is generally considered to have been able to keep 
its number of coronavirus cases low as a result, the 
remaining five countries reacted much more slowly. 
Moreover, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine 
declared national states of emergency in the last two 
weeks. Azerbaijan considers introducing it as well if 
the situation gets worse.9
Crisis management throughout the region is seriously 
undermined by a lack of action plans, poor coordi-
nation across different government agencies, and 
the scarcity of professionals in related ministries and 
national crisis units. In Moldova, for example, not a 
single doctor can be found on its current Commis-
sion for Exceptional Situations. Georgia is a laud-
able exception; the government there put three 
health professionals in the driver’s seat of its national 
response to the crisis. 
In some EaP countries, political turmoil is also a fac-
tor. While Ukraine underwent a recent government 
reshuffle, the country saw three health ministers in 
one month. Previously, in September 2019, Ukrainian 
President Volodymyr Zelenskiy had made the unpop-
ular decision to dismiss the country’s longest-serv-
ing health minister, Ulyana Suprun, while she was 
7 “Dubilet Told How Many Ukrainians Returned Home During the Coronavirus” [in Ukrainian], Слово і діло, April 4, 2020: 
<https://www.slovoidilo.ua/2020/04/02/novyna/suspilstvo/dubilet-rozpoviv-skilky-ukrayincziv-povernulosya-dodomu-koronavirusu> (accessed April 5, 2020). 
8 Author’s compilation of border police data regarding border crossings (www.border.gov.md) based on the number of entries into the country during from 
March 16 to April 5, 2020.
9 “Cabinet Doesn’t Rule Out Declaring State of Emergency in Azerbaijan,” Azeri Daily, April 2, 2020:  
<https://azeridaily.com/news/55078> (accessed April 5, 2020). 
Source: World Health Organisation, Coronavirus Disease (COVID-2019) Situation Reports, March 1-April 5, 2020:  
<https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/situation-reports> (accessed April 6, 2020). 
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undertaking comprehensive measures to overhaul 
the dysfunctional health-care system. Moldova also 
saw two health ministers in less than six months, the 
latest of whom has a law degree.
Authoritarian Responses
In Azerbaijan, President Ilham Aliyev has used the 
pandemic as an opportunity to threaten to crack 
down on the country’s political opposition, describ-
ing it as a “dangerous fifth column.” Aliyev used his 
annual address on Nowruz, the holiday marking 
the beginning of spring, to state that, if a state of 
emergency needs to be installed, “the isolation of 
representatives of the fifth column will become a 
historical necessity.”10 Days later several opposition 
activists were arrested. 
Like other authoritarian leaders across the globe, 
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko down-
played the risks of the coronavirus, recommending 
that his country’s citizens drink vodka and visit sau-
nas to protect their health. At the same time, he or-
dered state security services to investigate anyone 
who falsely reports a death related to Covid-19. In 
both Belarus and Azerbaijan, media supportive of the 
government also systematically downplay the dan-
gers that the coronavirus poses.
On March 18, President Lukashenko was taken by 
worrying surprise when Russia decided unilaterally 
to close its border with Belarus for six weeks as a 
“proactive step” to counteract the pandemic’s spread 
– despite the treaty establishing their Union State 
that both countries signed in 1999.11 On March 31, 
sporting venues, schools, and restaurants in Belar-
us still remained open, although citizens had started 
wearing masks.12 While remaining defiant, Lukashenko 
is now taking precautionary measures such as im-
plementing targeted testing and ordering increased 
production of ventilators.
In other countries in the region, controversial mea-
sures have also been adopted or attempted. In 
Armenia, for instance, the government started col-
lecting and tracking personal data via a smartphone 
app or, alternatively, a “travel sheet” that citizens are 
required to fill in every time they leave their homes.13 
In Moldova, civil society managed to reverse a gov-
ernment attempt to restrict media freedom on re-
porting related to Covid-19.
INTERNATIONAL HEALTH 
ASSISTANCE AMIDST  
GEOPOLITICAL COMPETITION
Alongside other international donors, Russia, the 
United States, China, and the European Union have 
all stepped in to help the region to various degrees 
and with differing quality of support. Russia supplied 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Moldova with tests 
for diagnosing Covid-19. It has also sent testing kits 
and other medical equipment to the breakaway re-
gions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and plans to 
send them to the region of Transnistria as well.14 Chi-
na supplied Ukraine and Moldova with medical and 
personal equipment. As part of its latest installment 
to Ukraine, China delivered 300,000 respiratory 
masks, 35,000 protective suits, and 1.8 million medi-
cal masks.15 The United States authorized humanitar-
ian assistance to most of the countries in the region: 
$1.1 million for Armenia, $1.7 million for Azerbaijan, 
$1.1 million for Georgia, $1.2 million for Moldova, and 
$1.2 million for Ukraine.16
While Russia and China loudly and visibly compete 
for an international leadership role in providing sup-
port around the pandemic, the EU is quietly deliv-
ering its assistance without much fanfare. The EU 
reallocated €140 million to address the most imme-
diate needs, supporting the supply of medical and 
10 Joshua Kucera, “Azerbaijan’s President Suggests Coronavirus May Require a Crackdown on Opposition,” Eurasianet, March 19, 2020:  
<https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijans-president-suggests-coronavirus-may-require-a-crackdown-on-opposition> (accessed April 1, 2020).
11 Robyn Dixon, “No Lockdown Here: Belarus’ Strongman Rejects Coronavirus Risks. He Suggests Saunas and Vodka,” Washington Post, March 28, 2020: 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/no-lockdown-here-belaruss-strongman-rejects-coronavirus-risks-he-suggests-saunas-and-vodka/2020
/03/27/7aab812/?arc404=true> (accessed April 1, 2020).
12 Ray Fulon, “Belarus Lives it up as Neighbours Lock Down Over Covid-19,” RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty, March 30, 2020:  
<https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-lives-it-up-as-neighbors-lock-down-over-covid-19/30518084.html> (accessed April 1, 2020).
13 “A Citizen Must Have a Certificate, Even if He Goes to the Nearest Store - the Deputy Chief of Police” [in Russian], Armen press, March 28, 2020:  
<https://armenpress.am/rus/news/1010386.html> (accessed April 1, 2020).
14 Linda Grau, “Rosian Vasiloi: Why Doesn’t Chisinau Handle the Situation in the Transnistrian Region, Even though It Provides All the Necessary Support?” 
[in Romanian], Radio Free Europe Moldova, March 29, 2020: <https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/rosian-vasiloi-de-ce-chi%C8%99in%C4%83ul-nu-
gestioneaz%C4%83-situa%C8%9Bia-din-regiunea-transnistrean%C4%83-de%C8%99i-acord%C4%83-tot-sprijinul-necesar-/30515869.html?fbclid=IwAR0r
OETxRX0ZW6ItoxFtRygWpZp20V-nyocHB2M_WpoIpMSYYMlRaOi3CJQ> (accessed April 1, 2020).
15 Pavlo Podufalov, “A Cargo Plane Delivers More Medical Supplies from China,” Kyiv Post, March 29, 2020:  
<https://www.kyivpost.com/multimedia/photo/a-cargo-plane-delivers-more-medical-supplies-from-china> (accessed April 1, 2020).
16 US Department of State, “The United States Is Leading the Humanitarian and Health Assistance Response to COVID-19,” March 27, 2020:  
<https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-is-leading-the-humanitarian-and-health-assistance-response-to-covid-19/> (accessed April 1, 2020).
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FIGURE 2: EAP MEASURES AGAINST COVID-19 AS OF 6 APRIL, 2020
Source: Author’s compilation of data from “Coronavirus in the Eastern 
Partnership states (updates),” New Eastern Europe, April 5, 2020:
<https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/03/16/coronavirus-in-the-eastern-
partnership-states/> (accessed April 5, 2020).
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personal equipment such as ventilators, laborato-
ry kits, masks, and safety suits. This money will al-
so be used to bolster national health administra-
tions by helping them to train medical and laboratory 
staff, as well as implement measures to raise aware-
ness among the wider population. The World Health 
Organization (WHO) has received €30 million of this 
amount as contribution to respond to the health cri-
sis in the region. In addition, the EU will redirect the 
use of existing instruments worth up to €700 mil-
lion to help mitigate the socioeconomic impact of 
the Covid-19 crisis in the countries of the EaP by sup-
porting their real economies, including small and me-
dium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The European Com-
mission has also made more than €11.3 million in 
small grants available to civil society organizations.
Notwithstanding the mobilization of these signifi cant 
resources for the region despite its own shortages and 
dramatic challenges during the pandemic, the EU still 
seems to be a step behind its competitors – primari-
ly Russia and China – in showcasing its support. Due 
to a complex decision-making process within the EU, 
it took a while for Brussels to respond. Improving the 
EU’s communication strategy on the ground is key in 
this regard.
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17 Denis Trubetskoy, “Coronavirus-Blog Osteuropa: Das Corona-Virus macht alle Ukrainer gleich,” MDR aktuell (blog), March 30, 2020: <https://www.mdr.de/
nachrichten/osteuropa/ostblogger/corona-blog-osteuropa-100.html?fbclid=IwAR1iBlKDCERthAGaTusvLM9Kb1G9nv9AbugCyG3GSoZiqfKEo5tfH1TI5xw> 
(accessed April 1, 2020).
18 Online conversation with Valerij Pekar (entrepreneur and co-founder of the civil platform “The New Country”), “Ukraine: Economic Impact of Corona,” 
Center for Liberal Modernity, April 1, 2020.
19 Daryna Antoniuk, “Avakov Favors Extending Ukraine’s Quarantine until May 12,” Kyiv Post, March 30, 2020: <https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/
avakov-favors-extending-ukraines-quarantine-until-may-12.html> (accessed April 1, 2020).
20 Melinda Haring, “How Will the Poorest Country in Europe Deal with the Coronavirus?”, The National Interest, March 30,2020: <https://nationalinterest.
org/feature/how-will-poorest-country-europe-deal-coronavirus-138927> (accessed April 1, 2020).
21 The World Bank, “Personal Remittances, Received (% of GDP) – Moldova,” 2019: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.
ZS?locations=MD> (accessed April 1, 2020).
22 Institutul de Politici și Reforme Europene (IPRE), “Impact of COVID-19 on the Republic of Moldova: What Short- and Medi-um-Term Interventions are 
Needed to Minimize the Effects?”, March 26, 2020:n <http://ipre.md/2020/03/26/impactul-covid-19-asupra-republicii-moldova-ce-interventii-pe-termen-
scurt-si-mediu-sunt-necesare-pentru-a-minimiza-efectele/?fbclid=IwAR24YJ3kqAOY9UzgZhtm53nd0pYLGMz8Nsitr86IP29J6tXjk1z4X9sjtHI> (accessed 
April 1, 2020).
A MAJOR SOCIOECONOMIC 
CATASTROPHE AHEAD 
While the positive effects of humanitarian measures 
to address the pandemic are gradually kicking in, 
EaP countries are already under significant econom-
ic pressure from the partial shutdown of four out of 
six of their economies (for now). According to a re-
search study, 57 percent of Ukrainians have savings for 
no more than four weeks. An additional 20 percent on-
ly have enough savings for another month after that.17 
Twenty-five percent of employers in the country say 
they are already being forced to consider layoffs or 
decreasing salaries.18 If the current quarantine is ex-
tended to mid-May, as alluded to recently by Interi-
or Minister Arsen Avakov, Ukraine is headed for a ma-
jor economic disaster.19 According to some estimates, 
500,000 to 700,000 Ukrainians have already been laid 
off as a result of the pandemic, and this number could 
increase five times over the next several weeks.20 Ar-
menia and Georgia are also likely to face rising unem-
ployment rates and severe contraction of their GDPs. 
Such developments may cause major social unrest.
On top of the already simmering political pressure 
within countries such as Ukraine and Moldova, ma-
ny migrants have returned home after major layoffs in 
other European countries, where they had been resid-
ing. Of Moldova’s population of 3.5 million, nearly one 
million Moldovans currently live abroad; one sixth of 
the country’s GDP for 2018 consisted of personal re-
mittances that they sent back home.21 Of the Moldo-
vans abroad, approximately 300 to 350 thousand are 
seasonal workers with short-term contracts. Seven-
ty thousand of them are in the precarious situation 
of being laid off immediately.22 Many have already re-
turned home, and more are still trying. The critical 
mass of citizens that once chose to voice its criticism 
of domestic conditions by leaving has returned par-
tially, and they will demand respect and economic op-
portunities from the state. More immediately, citizens 
will demand health systems that can protect them. 
SOCIAL IMPACT, DEMOCRACY, AND 
THE IMPORTANCE OF EU SUPPORT
At first glance, the six EaP countries may seem more 
prepared to face this crisis than they actually are. 
After all, the early 1990s were the “best” surviv-
al training they could get. In fact, people still live 
in survival mode in many parts of the post-Sovi-
et space. This pandemic, however, is likely to shake 
these societies to their core, especially as there is 
very little trust in government institutions – a key 
ingredient for a society to hold together in times 
of crisis. The consequences of institutions that lack 
credibility and sometimes even professionals to lead 
them, including those in the health-care sector, can 
be profound and beyond what anyone could imagine. 
Strong institutions that society can rely on, partic-
ularly during crises, denote an important difference 
between developed and developing countries. Un-
der current circumstances, no flights are available 
to take political leaders from the region to hospitals 
in Western countries for first-class treatment. While 
those leaders could hoard resources from national 
health-care systems, such as ventilators, for them-
A chance to reset the 
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selves or bribe a team of doctors to take care of them 
first if necessary, governing elites and ordinary citi-
zens are now generally in the same boat. These cir-
cumstances provide the chance for two equally likely 
outcomes in the region: first, the chance to reset the 
rusty social contract and focus on genuine institu-
tion-building, and, second, the opportunity for au-
thoritarianism to thrive. The EU, unlike Russia or 
China, is able to ensure that the latter is not the case.
What’s more, in the four states that have declared a 
state of emergency, democratic checks and balanc-
es may easily be ignored. Armenia, Georgia, Moldo-
va, and Ukraine are rather fragile democracies. In 
those countries, with information spaces vulnerable 
to propaganda and disinformation, there is a signif-
icant risk that the temporary restrictions on free-
dom in exchange for health security could become 
permanent.22 In this context, Moldova and Georgia 
are headed for national elections this autumn; in-
formal campaigning has already started, and there 
is a heightened risk for unfair results. Belarus is al-
so preparing for presidential elections this summer. 
In Ukraine, against the background of a political cri-
sis and government reshuffle in early March, there 
are mounting concerns over an opaque deal coming 
together between Kyiv and Moscow on the conflict 
settlement in the Donbas region, as well as possible 
local elections in autumn. The potential for misuse 
of power in times of crisis is high – with long-term 
consequences for the stability of the region. 
The EU has already proven that it can swiftly mo-
bilize support for its neighbors with immediate hu-
manitarian aid. But as a geopolitical force in the 
making, it could make the difference in the outcomes 
of each of these concrete political situations, as well 
as for the future of these countries in a post-corona-
virus world. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
None of the six EaP countries has a coherent nation-
wide epidemic strategy and, more importantly in 
the long term, none has a sustainable action plan for 
economic recovery in an epidemic’s wake. While it is 
yet too early to make full-fledged recommendations, 
particularly when the EU itself is in crisis manage-
ment mode, Brussels should:
1.  Support EaP governments in developing and implementing coherent nationwide epidemic 
strategies. The EU should also advocate for immedi-
ate action to protect the region’s most vulnerable so-
cial groups, including the elderly, seasonal workers, 
returning migrants and small entrepreneurs.
2.  Closely monitor that governments do not misuse their extended powers for antidemo-
cratic measures by cooperating with international 
and national watchdog organizations. Preserving 
the fragile tenets of democracy at its eastern bor-
ders during this crisis will be an important long-term 
challenge for the EU, also in terms of its role and le-
gitimacy as a geopolitical player in its neighborhood. 
3.  Coordinate with the World Health Organization and international financial institutions such as 
the IMF and World Bank to provide health and finan-
cial assistance in its eastern neighborhood – includ-
ing immediate liquidity and simplified credit lines 
– to mitigate the economic impact of the restric-
tions already imposed and ensure that the assistance 
reaches target audiences in each country. 
4.  Guide the partner countries in developing sustainable national action plans for economic 
recovery in the short and medium term once the 
pandemic is over.
5.  Improve its communication strategy regard- ing the support alloted for the region. 
6.  Use the Eastern Partnership Summit in June to coordinate crisis management efforts through-
out the region and increase solidarity with the part-
ner countries. While the European Commission has 
invested effort in the last five months to put together 
a strategy for the EaP beyond 2020, it needs to be 
revised or amended to address economic and secu-
rity challenges in the aftermath of the coronavirus 
pandemic.
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